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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
By EDWARD DUMBAULD *
ASCERTAINMENT OF LAW BY ANALYSIS OF CONDUCT
The law prevailing in a given society or community is scientifically
ascertainable by objective scrutiny of conduct therein.' It is composed
of those rules which are in fact accepted and observed as being obliga-
tory or normative standards of behavior, appropriate for enforcement
by public authority.2 Two complementary characteristics are essential:
the rule must actually be in force in the community, and not a mere
ideal or imagined precept; and it must be a rule prescribing what ought
to be done, rather than a mere description of what is in fact done.'
Insistence upon the first of these two requirements enables us to
lay aside rules which judges and other officials piously profess but would
never actually apply. It enables us also to formulate rules which they
do in fact apply, consciously or unconsciously, but would never openly
acknowledge.4 Like all human conduct, that which deals with the
official promulgation of law is marked by certain fictions and conceal-
ments dictated by propriety or vanity. A lawyer, like a psychiatrist,
must be able to penetrate these deceptive appearances and, at least for
purposes of his own analysis, state the rules of law in unconventional
terms, however shocking or amusing such a version of social phenomena
may appear.5 Insistence upon what is actually enforced rather than
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what is judicially proclaimed has been a healthy tendency encouraged
in recent years by the so-called "functional" or "realistic" school of
jurists."
Yet there has been some danger that in saying that law is what
public officials do,' those jurists might overlook the second distinguish-
ing characteristic of law mentioned above, and ignore the normative
nature of legal rules. It must thus be emphasized that no mere de-
scription of actual conduct is sufficient; one wishing to know the law
must inquire what norms or standards for behavior are presupposed
by and deducible from the conduct observed.
LAW REGARDING THE FORMATION OF LAW
Some of the rules of law derived from objective analysis of conduct
within a given society will be rules relating to the methods by which
law is produced in the society. These rules will specify the "sources
of law": usually such sources will include, in addition to custom and
usage, the acts of certain law-making bodies and the decisions of cer-
tain law-applying bodies 8 (ordinarily called courts).' The relative
rank and authority of the several sources of law will also be indicated:
thus statutory rules emanating from a legislative assembly may be
regarded as superseding inconsistent rules previously created by judi-
cial tribunals; on the other hand, the courts may sometimes have the
power to invalidate statutes enacted by the legislative body.
Law regarding the creation of law is commonly called "con-
stitutional" or organic law. It may or may not be contained in rules
emanating from the same sources as other legal rules. In England
constitutional law is declared by courts and acts of Parliament; in the
United States it is found in written documents issuing from special
law-making bodies having higher authority than the ordinary legis-
6. Bohlen, Old Phrases and New Facts, 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 305 (1935).
7. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 4 (1930). Cf. HOLMES, CoLLEcr LEGAL
PAPERS 173 (1920). Much of what public officials do is mere routine administration
or political activity, unrelated to formation of rules of law.
8. John Chipman Gray thought that all law was really generated by the law-
applying body. But this assumes that no human communication can be made so clear
as not to require interpretation. Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 639, 656, n. 45 (1926).
9. The term "court" sometimes refers simply to the people surrounding a monarch;
such "courtiers" may have the assignment of handing him his shoes or other tasks of
the toilette rather than any duties connected with the formulation or application of
law. At other times a court may be a legislative assembly (as the "High Court of
Parliament," or the "Great and General Court of Massachusetts"). Ordinarily the
word indicates a judicial tribunal. The extent to which such tribunals create law also
varies. It is greater in jurisdictions governed by the Anglo-American common law
than in Civil law countries. It is also greater in a court of last resort such as the
United States Supreme Court than in lower courts; and greater there in the case of
constitutional law, where action by a legislative assembly is less feasible, than in other
fields of law.
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latures,' ° and in court decisions commenting upon those writtern
constitutions.
But analysis of the prevailing system of law in any society (everr
of that relatively undeveloped system of law called international law
which governs relations among the society of nation-states) will reveal
that it possesses a "constitutional" law, and that each legal rule form-
ing part of the system rests ultimately upon a "fundamental norm!'"
from which all subordinate legislation derives its validity."
HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
"It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment, to say what the law is." " Hence it follows that a court making
such a determination must heed the hierarchical priority of the various
sources of law, and properly evaluate what each contributes.
Thus, just as the court in ascertaining the state of statutory law
alone must often reconcile conflicts and resolve questions whether cer-
tain provisions have or have not been repealed or modified by the effect
of subsequent language, and just as the same task must often be per-
formed in order to clarify the effect of interacting judicial pronounce-
ments, so must the court also in reaching its ultimate conclusion in a
case where constitutional provisions are involved determine what the
result is of its combined consideration of all relevant sources of law.
For example, a Pennsylvania court in considering a particular
question might find a Common Pleas case in point, but then discover
that that holding had been reversed by the Supreme Court of the
State. The further discovery might then be made that to obviate the
ill effects of the Supreme Court's decision an act of assembly had been
passed, restoring the rule established by the Common Pleas Court. It
might next be ascertained that this legislation had been unsuccessfully
challenged in the Supreme Court, upon the ground that the title of the
10. "The constitution of Connecticut is made up of usages," said Paterson, J. in
Calder v. Bull, 3 DalI. 386, 395 (U.S. 1798). The Virginia Constitution of 1776 was
in writing but was enacted by the ordinary legislature. See text at note 23 infra.
But these instances were unusual in America. Regarding the importance of judge-
made "constitutional theory" which goes far beyond the written instruments, see
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 94 (1938) ; JAcKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDI-
CIAL SUPREMACY XV (1941).
11. Dumbauld, The Place of Philosophy in International Law, 83 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 590, 593 (1935). Thus a city ordinance has the force of law because a State
statute has given it that effect; the acts of the State legislature in turn are law only
because the State constitution has vested the legislature with law-making power.
Recognition of the fundamental norm (Grundnorm) and the hierarchical structure of
law (Stufenbau) are significant contributions of the "Vienna School" of jurisprudence
led by Kelsen, Verdross, and Merkl. See KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEIHRE 104
(1925); VERDROSS, DIE VERFASSUNG DER V6LKEPRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 43 (1926).
But Oliver Cromwell in 1654 voiced the same notion. DIcKINSON, ADMINISTRATIvE
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREmACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATSS 81 n. 15 (1927).
12. Marshall, C. J., in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (U.S. 1803).
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bill did not adequately describe its subject-matter, as required by the
State constitution. Then it might be learned that Congress had "oc-
cupied the field" by a federal statute regulating the whole subject
matter. And finally, it might then be found that the United States
Supreme Court had held the act of Congress unconstitutional.
In each step of this process of investigation to ascertain what the
law is, it must be emphasized that the court is doing the same thing
right along. The nature of its task does not alter when it comes to
deal with the question of the unconstitutionality of a statute. In each
stage of its inquiry it is simply applying the data derived from relevant
sources of law, in accordance with their respective priority of rank and
authority, in order to reach its ultimate determination as to the statei
of the law.
Thus the power of a court to pass upon the validity of an act of the
legislature is simply one aspect of the court's ordinary power and duty
to determine what the law is on a given matter after duly applying
and evaluating the various relevant elements entering into such a de-
termination. The court is merely respecting the hierarchy of author-
ity " established by the constitutional law of the legal system of the
society when it holds that what is lower must yield to what is higher. 4
Such respect for hierarchical authority in dealing with the various
layers of the legal structure adequately accounts for the institution of
"judicial review," without reference to a written constitution or any
doctrine of popular sovereignty. The constitution prevails over the act
of the legislature merely because it is higher than that which is inferior
to it, not because it is "higher law" in the sense of a mystical code em-
bodying natural justice and superior to all precepts based on human
will.' 5
Thus the doctrine of judicial review at first had no connection
with a written fundamental law adopted by the people as the supreme
power in the state. Corwin remarks that "judicial review initially
had nothing to do with a written constitution." 16
13. That the structure of a legal system is characterized by the existence of
various strata or stages of authority is expressed in the terminology of the Vienna
School by the term Stufenbau ("stage structure"). In English the idea may be more
clearly expressed by the words "hierarchy of authority," or equivalent language.
14. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (U.S. 1819): ". . . where
this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that
over which it is supreme."
15. Regarding "higher law" in the latter sense see DICKINSoN, op. cit. supra note
11, at 96-104; Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1928).
16. Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts,
25 No=ra DAME LAw. 258, 266 (1950). (Italics in the original.) See also Corwin,
Judicial Reziew in Action, 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. 639 (1926). Regarding judicial
review generally see CoRwINr, THE DOCtRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1914) and HAINES,
THE A M cAN DOcrIaNE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2nd ed. 1932).
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If the legal system recognizes principles of "natural law" based
upon inherent justice as being a source of law of higher authority than
a precept established by the legislature, then of course the latter must
yield to the former. James Otis, arguing against the odious writs of
assistance in 1761, asserted that under English precedents an act of
Parliament contrary to natural justice was void." And at a later date
American courts in fact did hold statutes void because of repugnance
to natural justice IS until they found a firmer footing in the written
language of the due process clause; by relying upon that the same re-
sults might be achieved. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court is
today still prolific in rendering "natural law" decisions under the due
process clause. To be sure, the discredited dogma of "liberty of con-
tract," developed for the benefit of laissez-faire capitalism out of Justice
Field's expansion of the concept of "pursuit of happiness" as a con-
stitutional right, has now been abandoned. 9 But it has been replaced
by a "new liberty" which is just as much the product of judicial legis-
lation and just as much the child of natural law doctrines as was the
social and economic philosophy which it supplanted. This modern ver-
sion of liberty is concerned with the privileges of picketers, prisoners,
proselyters, publicans (in the Scriptural sense), and pigmented portions
of the population. 0 Moreover, it would not be far-fetched to regard
17. Paxton's Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761); 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 522, 525
(1850) ; DICKINSoN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 91.
18. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662 (U.S. 1874); Webster v. Reid, 11
How. 437, 459 (U.S. 1850) ; Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 11, at 101; EVANS, LEADING
CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 328 (1916); HAINES, THE REViVAL OF
NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 79, 101, 211 (1930) ; SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFTS-
MAN OF THE LAW 422-25 (1930); Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Con-
stitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv. 247, 252 (1914); Grant, The Natural Law Back-
ground of Due Process, 31 CoL. L. REv. 56, 57 (1931); Grant, The "Higher Law"
Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67, 71-81 (1931);
Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Deciionm, 25 YALE L. J.
617 (1916); Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Lawl" Prior to the Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 583, 592 (1930) ; Reeder, Constitu-
tional and Extra-Constitutional Restraints, 61 U. OF PA. L. REV. 441 (1913).
Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dali. 386, 387, 398 (U. S. 1798) ; Wynehamer v. New York,
13 N. Y. 378, 390 (1856); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 161
(1853).
19. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 41, 62 (1950). The course of this doctrine may be traced in Cummings v.
Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 321 (U.S. 1866); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 116
(U.S. 1872); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 755, 762
(1884) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589 (1897); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) ; West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendmnnt, 39 HARV.
L. REv. 431 (1926) ; CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MRANS TODAY 169,
195 (1948). Typical cases are Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); International Harvester v. Dep't of Treasury,
322 U.S. 340 (1944); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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the category of natural law decisions as also including the long line of
cases imposing restrictions on State power which are supposedly based
upon the commerce clause."'
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS
Since written constitutions very obviously are intended to be a
source of law of higher authority than the acts of the ordinary legis-
lature, it is natural that judicial review should flourish most vigorously
in America where written constitutions became the fashion. In the
famous case establishing the power of the United States Supreme Court
to set aside unconstitutional acts of Congress, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall dwelt upon the logical necessity of such power under a written
constitution imposing limitations upon the power of the ordinary
legislature:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitu-
tion is written .
Certainly, all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such govern-
ment must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the con-
stitution, is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written
constitution, and is, consequently, to be considered, by this court,
as one of the fundamental principles of our society.
Those, then, who controvert the principle, that the constitu-
tion is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, . . .
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions
. . . That it thus reduces to nothing, what we have deemed the
greatest improvement on political institutions, a written constitu-
tion, would, of itself, be sufficient, in America, where written
constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for reject-
ing the construction.2"
Marshall's political adversary, Thomas Jefferson, was equally
positive in demanding that the ordinary legislature be confined within
the limitations prescribed by a fundamental law. Perhaps one of the
21. Hays v. Pac. Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854) is recognized as
a decision based upon general principles of fairness and not on anything in the com-
merce clause. EVANS, LEADING CASES ON CONSTITrUIONA.L LAw 328 (1916) ; Powell,
Due Process Tests of State Taxation, 1922-1925, 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 423, 424 (1926).
See also, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) ; McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940); Bikl6, Book Review, 74 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 517 (1926).
22. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (U.S. 1803). See also 2 BRYcE,
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 10, 27 (1921).
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reasons why he was annoyed by the opinion in Marbury v. Madison
was because he suspected a subtle reference to his drafts of a proposed
constitution for Virginia when Marshall mentioned "those who have
framed written constitutions" as authorities supporting the conclu-
sions reached by the Chief Justice in that decision.
Jefferson contended that the Virginia constitution of 1776, al-
though in writing and called a constitution, was not in truth a funda-
mental law. That document had been enacted by the ordinary legis-
lature, and hence could be repealed or altered in the same manner by
the ordinary legislature. Jefferson believed that a constitution should
be adopted by a convention, specially empowered by the people to estab-
lish a frame of government inviolable by the ordinary legislature.'
WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
These contentions of Jefferson regarding the Virginia Constitu-
tion of 1776, and those of Otis regarding writs of assistance in 1761,
demonstrate that the significant feature of a constitution in connection
with judicial review is not whether it is written or unwritten, but its
hierarchical authority as a higher source of law than ordinary legisla-
tion. As a modern writer states: "the mere fact that a constitution
is written is immaterial apart from the contents of that constitution." 24
Jefferson wanted a constitution established by authority of the
people, because he believed in government by "the consent of the gov-
erned" and hence regarded the people as the supreme authority.
Because the Constitution of the United States was viewed as an
exercise by the people of the right of self-government claimed in and
proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence,2 5 the Constitution be-
came an object of worship in America.
2 6
As an instrument ordained by "the people," its supremacy was
derived from the fact that "the highest possible embodiment of human
23. 2 Woaxs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158-183 (1904) ; 4 id. at 22-28, 36, 149, 154;
5 id. at 14, 30; 6 id. at 160; 12 id. at 407; Patterson, Jefferson and Judicial Review,
30 A.B.A.J. 443 (1944) ; Patterson, Thomas Jefferson and the Constitution, 29 MiNN.
L. Riv. 265, 268 (1945).
24. Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-Conlstitutional Restraints, 61 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 441, 456 (1913).
25. Gulf, Colo. and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159 (1897); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404 (U.S. 1819) ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176
(U.S. 1803).
26. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1928). To a lesser degree this was true also of State consti-
tutions, though they often embodied voluminous details having little public interest.
At least three States have constitutions which were never approved by popular vote.
Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L.
REv. 67, 69 (1931).
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will, is 'the people'." 27 Hence "in the American written Constitution,
higher law at last attained a form which made possible the attribution
to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanat-
ing from the sovereign people. Once the binding force of higher law
was transferred to this new basis, the notion of the sovereignty of the
ordinary legislative organ 2 disappeared automatically since that can-
not be a sovereign law-making body which is subordinate to another
law-making body." 29
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND NATURAL LAW
That a system of law must rest on a basis of popular sovereignty
or consent of the governed in order to be legitimate is a "natural law"
assumption on the constitutional plane." Positivist jurists would hold
that the validity of law is sufficiently demonstrated if it is shown to rest
upon the fundamental norm or constitution (Grundnorm) of the sys-
tem. They would not claim for the people, at the constitutional level,
a right to participate in the process of making law unless the existence
of such a right was disclosed by analysis of the particular constitution
under consideration.
The absence of consent by the governed would not deprive of
validity a law duly enacted in accordance with the law-making pro-
cedure prescribed by the constitution any more than the circumstance
that the law might be unjust, unwise, or unreasonable. Indeed, to
regard a law as binding only when made by consent of the people is
perhaps merely a special case of the proposition that no law contrary
to natural justice is binding. Positivism would recognize a people's
right to self-government only where it was actually accorded by definite
constitutional provisions.
Popular sovereignty, as asserted in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, is thus a natural-law concept or principle of political philosophy,
just as the similar concept of inherent and unalienable rights proclaimed
.by that instrument rests upon natural law doctrines."
27. Corwin, mpra note 26, at 151. That government in the United States rested
upon the sovereignty of the people was stressed by James Madison and James Wilson.
9 MADISON, WRITINGS 386, 568, 604 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910); 3 WILSON, WORKS
292 (1804); ADAMS, POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIoN 142, 170-76
(1922).
28. As recognized in the English doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 et seq. (8th ed.
1923).
29. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REv. 149, 365, 409 (1928, 1929). (Italics in the original.)
30. Dumbauld, The Place of Philosophy in. International Law, 83 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 590, 596, 600 (1935). The resemblance between social compact doctrines and the
theory that international law must rest on the consent of states has not escaped notice.
31. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 39, 70 (1950). Natural rights philosophies are inevitably subjective and shaped
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That popular sovereignty, under Anglo-American constitutional
jurisprudence, does not remain a mere speculative principle but is ex-
tensively embodied in positive law provisions is a circumstance of
congratulation .
32
It cannot be denied, however, that there are areas of American
positive law where the principle is not applied. For example, resi-
dents of the District of Columbia have no vote. They are not repre-
sented in Congress. Their being governed by Congress is therefore
plainly a violation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, of the spirit
of the Declaration of Independence, and of the Revolutionary maxim
"Taxation without representation is tyranny." Yet I have no doubt
that a District of Columbia court would apply an act of Congress as
law. This demonstrates that the principle of hierarchy of authority is
controlling, rather than the principle of popular sovereignty, in judicial
determination of what the law is. Another example is the government
of occupied Germany or other conquered countries. The conqueror's
edicts, regardless of their acceptability to the population affected, would
doubtless be applied by courts as a source of law of superior authority
prevailing, in case of conflict, over contrary local enactments.
There is no difficulty, either, in conceiving of a legal system where
the supreme lawgiver recognized in the hierarchical structure would not
be the people at all, but an Emperor, Pope, King, Dictator, or Parlia-
ment deriving no authority whatever from the consent of the governed
(except in the sense that they acquiesce in such rule and do not revolt
against it). Thus even if the English Parliament should enact that the
members of Parliament were to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor
and hold office for life, acts of Parliament would still be law in English
courts.
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Nevertheless it is clear that the doctrine of popular sovereignty
made the acceptance of judicial review in America seem desirable as
well as natural and inevitable. This occurred because judicial review
came to be viewed as an effective weapon in the defense of popular
sovereignty when the will of the people received specific expression in
constitutional documents having higher authority than the enactments
emanating from other sources of law.
by individual idiosyncracies. Id. at 38. Thus a Kentucky court has held that "the
right to use liquor for one's own comfort, . . .is one of the citizen's natural and
inalienable rights, guaranteed to him by the Constitution." C'wealth v. Campbell, 133
Ky. 50, 63 (1909). But this has not received assent sernper et u-bique et ab onmibus.
32. Dumbauld, book review of VossLER, DIE AMERIKANISCHE RTOLUTIONSIDEALE
IN IHRFM VERHALTNIS ZU DEN EURoPAISCHEN, in 24 Am. POL. Sci. IEv. 773-75 (1930).
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That the power to give effect to the popular will as so enunciated
was entrusted to a professional class jealous of its independence and
prerogatives accentuated the vigor with which judicial review was ex-
ercised.' Both because of this esprit de corps in the legal profession,
and because the function of judicial review was regarded as a form of
homage to popular sovereignty, the prestige of the judiciary increased.
Not only were judges esteemed as guardians of the people's will,
but they retained their ancient glory as spokesmen of a "higher law"
embodying ethical justice and not resting on human volition. A
vestige of this historical tradition survives among lawyers in the re-
spect accorded to courts and the distrust felt toward administrative
bodies, even when both are equally agencies established by the same
public authority and manned by personnel of identical training and
ability.
8 4
The authority of courts was enhanced by a wide-spread belief
that judges did not make law but merely declared it, that they exer-
cised no volitional legislative function, but merely announced, as an
investigator in the natural sciences might do, the findings obtained as
the culminating results of a rational process of inquiry. Since by
reason of their professional training knowledge of all law was their
peculiar province, courts were regarded as especially qualified to ex-
pound constitutional law with authority. When they spoke as inter-
preters of the supreme law they were thought to be merely enforcing
the will of the people who had ordained and established it. More-
over, from the standpoint of practical politics, courts were thought to
be more trustworthy, as well as less corrupt and partisan, than other
agencies of government. Thus it was with a considerable degree of
popular acquiescence that the judiciary claimed and exercised the power
to review, for the purpose of determining their constitutionality, the
acts of other organs of government, including the ordinary elected
legislatures of the land.
Logically there was nothing wrong with this system. It was
natural that the professional function of determining what the law is
should include the incidental and subsidiary task of giving effect to the
supremacy of the supreme source of law. Practically, however, the
courts though professing to speak in the name and by authority of the
33. Corwin, supra note 29, at 182-83, 409.
34. See note 15 supra. This involved, in so far as juristic positivism was accepted,
an illicit transfer, to rules based merely upon public authority, of the reverence
habitually accorded to rules based upon justice. Corwin, supra note 29, at 409.
As to the listinction between judicial and administrative agencies, see ARNOLD, THE
SYmOLS OF GOVERNMENT 201-206 (1935) ; DICKINSON, ADMINISTrATIVE JUSTICE AND
THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UN TED STAES 76-77, 82-84, 93-95 (1927) ; Jackson,
An Organized American Bar, 18 A.B.A.J. 383 (1932).
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people introduced their own individual economic and political idio-
syncracies into their interpretation of vague and broad constitutional
language. Assuming "the powers of a super-legislature," '5 they struck
down statutes which were more consonant with the actual will of
the people than were the court decisions holding them unconstitutional.
Thus the United States Supreme Court held for nearly a quarter
of a century that Congress could not take action against child labor by
excluding from interstate commerce "the product of ruined lives." '6
Such decisions preventing governmental action to remedy acknowledged
evils, though they may be regarded in certain professional circles as
the essence of constitutional law,T are eloquent contradiction of the
proposition that judicial review is merely an agency for enforcing the
people's will.
In fact government regulation is often the only means the people
have of making their will effective against the machinations of power-
ful private interests." To hold such regulation unconstitutional is in
truth a denial rather than a vindication of popular sovereignty.
As Abraham Lincoln said in his First Inaugural: "The candid
citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary
litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal." "
35. Brandeis, J. dissenting in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534
(1924).
36. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280
(1918). This holding was not overruled until United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
115-17 (1941).
37. "To the professional mind the 'Constitution' that is worth talking about com-
prises judicial decisions purporting to interpret the constitutional document, but more
especially those decisions in which some natiomal or state law has been declared tuncon-
stitutional. Nor is this strange, for usually the best fees are to be had from those who
have an interest in resisting the extension of governmental authority; nor do the
decisions in which challenged legislation is sustained offer by any means the same
degree of promise of future litigation-and hence of fees-that the other sort do."
CoRWIx, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPR1EE COURT xxiii (1934). (Italics in the origi-
nal.) Judge Clark likewise comments on "the well-nigh complete obsession of the
American Bar Association with fears of governmental activity." Clark, Book Review,
54 YALE L.J. 172, 174 (1944).
38. JACKSOn, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xXiii (1941): "Our
struggle has been to restore effective government-the only means through which the
will and opinion of the people can have any expression."
39. Quoted in CoRwIN, COURT OVER CoNsrrruTioN 73 (1938). Justice Robert H.
Jackson recognizes the existence of a basic inconsistency between popular government
and judicial supremacy. JACKsoN, THE STRUGG E FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY vii
(1941). The same problem troubled Jefferson: "A judiciary independent of a king
or executive alone, is a good thing; but independence of the will of the nation itself
is a solecism, at least in a representative government." 12 JEi'i.soN, WoRxs 178
(1904).
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What caused public concern over the operation of judicial review
was the fact that court decisions directly contrary to the desires of
the people were rendered in doubtful and controversial matters of
burning political interest. And most of these decisions which antago-
nized popular sentiment were later recognized by history as having
been wrong.40 It was not the existence of judicial review, but the
manner in which it was exercised, that created controversy. ,
For no one can deny that by its intrinsic nature constitutional
law cannot be rigid, but calls for flexibility and a wide range of
judical discretion in the application of more or less elastic standards.
Characteristic of it is the amorphousness which annoyed John Chipman
Gray, that unrivaled master of the iron-clad rules of real property
law, and caused him to characterize constitutional law as being "not
law at all but politics." The court enjoys "a freedom virtually legis-
lative," enabling it "to achieve almost any result in the field of con-
stitutional interpretation which it considers desirable, and that with-
out flagrant departure from judicial good form." In the famous lan-
guage of John Marshall: "we must never forget that it is a consti-
tution that we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 41
The task of upholding the supremacy of a source of law whose
authority is controlling but whose commands are couched in vague
and substantially meaningless terms necessarily compels a court to
indulge in a certain amount of judicial legislation. This is legitimate
and unavoidable; it is a consequence of the necessity for deriving
specific decisions from indefinite generalities, for extracting concrete
meaning from something which contains none. It is what courts con-
stantly do, because cases must be decided, whether there is any genuine
governing authority applicable or not. Ex post facto interpretation
of a constitutional provision as to which the framers expressed no
actual intent is just the same process as discovering the supposed in-
tent of a statute or contract with respect to matters not dealt with
therein. But the fact that an agency of government is vested with a
large measure of "discretion," even in matters of political importance,
does not justify a continued course of decisions exercising that dis-
cretionary power in a manner contrary to public sentiment.
Popular dissatisfaction with judicial review in practice, when it
ceased to be a genuine expression of popular sovereignty in any but the
40. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY X (1941).
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315, 407, 415 (U.S. 1819) ; CORwiN, THE
TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 117, 181 (1934) ; Frankfurter, The Constitutioml
Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARv. L. REv. 683 (1916).
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most artificial sense, has produced many proposals designed to diminish
the uncontrolled political influence of the judiciary. In the case of the
Supreme Court of the United States, such proposals began with Jeffer-
son and culminated in Franklin D. Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan.
Jefferson urged in 1821 that the tenure of office of members of the
court be limited to a short term, such as six years.' In 1823 a proposal
was made in Congress that decisions holding statutes unconstitutional
should require a certain number of votes more than a bare majority of
the court.4 ' This scheme was revived a century later by Senator
Borah.44  A proposal by Senator La Follette would have permitted
a statute held unconstitutional to stand if re-enacted by Congress. 45
The La Follette and Borah schemes were offered again in 1937 by
Senators Wheeler and O'Mahoney.4 ' Roosevelt's plan, disclosed in his
message of February 5, 1937, was to authorize appointment of an addi-
tional Justice for each one over retirement age who did not retire.47
The various measures proposed to curb the court's power were
usually defective or undesirable in some respects, and they were never
adopted. Thus La Follette's plan is rather bizarre in that it is difficult
to see why an unconstitutional law should become constitutional if it
is passed twice. Similarly, Borah's scheme of requiring a vote of seven
out of nine members of the court to declare legislation unconstitutional
is illogical and contrary to the custom of majority rule which prevails
in the determination of all other legal questions by courts. Decisions
as to constitutionality, under our system, are simply one phase of the
exercise of the normal judicial function of ascertaining what the law
is, after giving due consideration to all sources of law in accordance
with their hierarchical authority.48 No judge should subordinate his
own opinion to that of others in constitutional questions any more than
42. 2 WARREN, THE SuPREuE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 116 (1922).
43. Id. at 123-24.
44. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPR F.E COURT 179 et seq.
(1925).
45. Id. at 138.
46. JACKSON, THE STEUGarZ FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 352-53 (1941).
47. 81 CONG. REc. 877-881; H.R. REP. No. 4417, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937);
Fite and Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme Court-State Experietwes and Federal
Proposals, 35 MICH. L. REv. 762 (1937). This scheme had been proposed in 1869
by Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio, one of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890
393-96 (1939).
48. See text at notes 13 and 14 supra. Courts possess no substantive power of
vetoing legislation, such as had been proposed in the Constitutional Convention of
1787. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ; CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1938) ;
1 FARAND, THE RECORDS OF THE. FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 21, 104, 131, 138-40
(1911).
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in any other questions coming before the court for determination.
49
Likewise, Roosevelt's plan to replace over-age judges who did not
resign might have made the personnel of the court too numerous and
unwieldy. It would have permitted as many as fifteen members.50
But although none of the court reform proposals were adopted,
they were beneficial to the public, nonetheless, in making courts aware
of the necessity for self-imposed limitations upon the political activity
of the judiciary. They achieved their purpose in causing the courts to
correct their own errors,51 to apply the standard of reasonableness to
judicial action as well as to that of other governmental agencies, and
to go "back to the Constitution" for principles of constitutional law
instead of continuing to sponsor unacceptable judge-made theories as
an official gloss upon or substitute for the written document. In so
doing judicial review regained its legitimate function as a weapon for
the defense of popular sovereignty.
49. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401 (1937) ; WARREN, CON-
GRESS, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 204-6 (1925) ; Corwin, Judicial
Review it Action, 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639, 646 (1926).
50. Dumbauld, A National Court of Appeals, 29 GEo. L.J. 461, 465-66 (1941).
51. Subsequent history has justified Corwin's confidence in corrective action by
the court itself as the most appropriate technique for bringing constitutional law into
accord with the principles of popular sovereignty and democratic government. CORWIN,
THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 117, 181 (1934); CORWIN, THE COMMERCE
POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS 265 (1936); CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 68,
126-27 (1938); JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY Vii (1941); 3
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 470 (1922). The need
for judicial self-restraint was well stated by Mr. Justice Stone in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) : "while unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
An illustration of unconstitutional judicial action is found in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT
73 (1949).
